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Kleinberg and Eleftherakis: Dignity for All Students Act

I’LL SEE YOU IN COURT, BUT NOT PURSUANT TO DASA
Adam I. Kleinberg & Alex Eleftherakis*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2018, both New York State and New York City strengthened
their laws designed to prevent incidents of workplace sexual
harassment.1 #MeToo has been a constant source of media coverage
and public discussion.
But the goal of ending all types of harassment is not a new one.
It has been a legislative focus for years, especially in public schools.
In the wake of the shooting at Columbine high school in 1999, states
across the country began passing anti-bullying laws to address and
prevent incidents of violence and harassment in our schools’ halls.2
For its part, New York passed the Dignity for All Students Act
(hereinafter “DASA”) in 2010.3 The goal of DASA is to provide
students with an educational environment free of discrimination,
harassment, and bullying through the implementation of proactive and
preventative policies and procedures. But what is the remedy for a
student who claims his or her school has failed to live up to its
obligations under DASA? Does the statute provide a mechanism to
recover monetary damages in a civil lawsuit?
While the New York State and City statutes referenced above
permit a private right of action and an award of monetary damages,
whether DASA permitted these has been an open question in the
Appellate Division, Second Department since the statute’s enactment.

* Attorneys at Law, Sokoloff Stern LLP.
1 See Kristin Klein Wheaton, New Legislation on Sexual Harassment, N.Y. ST. BAR ASSOC.,
http://www.nysba.org/Section/Municipal_Lawyer/New_Legislation_on_Sexual_Harassment
_Will_Significantly_Affect_the_Handling_of_These_Cases_for_Municipalities/ (last visited
Jan. 31, 2019).
2 Dimitrios Nikolaou, Do Anti-Bullying Policies Deter In-School Bullying Victimization?,
50 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 1-2 (2017).
3 2010 N.Y. Laws 482 (codified at N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 10-18).
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Until recently, that is. The Appellate Division has now answered the
question.
II.

WHAT IS DASA?

On September 13, 2010, New York State Governor David
Paterson signed New York State’s DASA into law.4 The statute took
effect on July 1, 2012 with amendments effective on July 1, 2013.5
DASA amended New York Education Law by creating a new
section (Article 2—Dignity for All Students)6 and amending Section
801-a of New York Education Law.7 According to the New York State
Education Department, DASA requires
instruction in civility, citizenship, and character
education by expanding the concepts of tolerance,
respect for others and dignity to include: an awareness
and sensitivity in the relations of people, including but
not limited to, different races, weights, national origins,
ethnic groups, religions, religious practices, mental or
physical abilities, sexual orientations, gender identity,
and sexes.8
The statute further amended Section 2801 of the Education
Law by requiring the boards of education of public school districts to
include DASA requirements in their codes of conduct. School districts
must also collect and report data regarding “material incidents of
discrimination, harassment, and bullying.”9 All of this is to “provide
the State’s public elementary and secondary school students with a safe
and supportive environment free from discrimination, intimidation,
taunting, harassment, and bullying on school property, a school bus
and/or at a school function.”10
These goals seem beyond cavil. Who would argue that
children should be subjected to hostile learning environments or that
school districts need not discourage and prohibit them?
4 The Dignity Act, N.Y. ST. EDUC. DEP’T, http://www.p12.nysed.gov/dignityact/ (last
updated July 9, 2018).
5
Id.
6 N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 10-18 (McKinney 2018).
7 Id. § 801-a.
8 The Dignity Act, supra note 4.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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A question arises when there is an allegation a school district
has not met its DASA requirements. In that situation, who is the arbiter
of such a claim and what remedies may be awarded?
III.

THE ESKENAZI CASE

J.E.M. was a high school student enrolled at Connetquot High
School, part of the Connetquot Central School District (hereinafter
“Connetquot”).11 He also received additional special education
instruction from Eastern Suffolk BOCES (hereinafter “ESB”) at a
separate location.12
During the 2012-13 school year, J.E.M. rode the morning
school bus to Connetquot, took a bus from Connetquot to ESB for an
afternoon program, and rode the school bus home from ESB at the end
of the day.13 J.E.M. alleged another special education student harassed
him throughout the school year.14
J.E.M. first sued Connetquot and ESB in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging violations
of federal and state law for failing to prevent another student from
allegedly harassing him.15 After the Eastern District dismissed all
federal causes of action and declined to assert jurisdiction over the state
law claims, J.E.M. re-filed the state law claims in the Suffolk County
Supreme Court.16 One of the state law claims was for an alleged
violation of DASA.17
A.

The Trial Court Decision

Defendants filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss portions of the
complaint, including those seeking recovery under DASA.18 The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss the DASA claim.19

11

Eskenazi-McGibney v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist., 89 N.Y.S.3d 295, 296 (App. Div.,
2d Dep’t 2018).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15
Eskenazi-McGibney v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist., 84 F. Supp. 3d 221 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
16 Eskenazi-McGibney, 89 N.Y.S.3d at 295.
17 Id.
18 Eskenazi-McGibney v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 15-11449, slip op. at 2 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 18, 2016).
19 Id. at 5.
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The trial court found that the text of DASA does not include
any express private cause of action for an aggrieved student.20
Specifically, the trial court found “[DASA] does not provide any
enforcement mechanisms, and it is silent with respect to remedies for
a violation.”21
Accordingly, a plaintiff may only assert a DASA claim if the
principles of statutory construction allow for an implied right of action
for a violation of the statute. Here, the trial court reasoned DASA
allows an implied right of action under “the long-standing rule of
statutory construction . . . that a private right of action for the violation
of a statute exists for the benefit of persons injured by that violation.”22
In determining whether DASA provides a private right of
action, the trial court found an implied claim promotes the legislative
purpose of the statute because it “would provide an incentive to enforce
the anti-bullying policy and create a deterrent for those officials who
would ignore the complaints of those students who the statute seeks to
protect,” and followed DASA’s legislative scheme because DASA
“and its implementing regulations are not simply remedial in nature
but afford the students various rights and impose an affirmative duty
on school officials to provide the students with an environment that is
free from discrimination, bullying and harassment.”23
Neither the New York State Court of Appeals nor the Second
Department had decided this issue whether DASA affords an implied
private cause of action. However, in an unpublished 2014 short form
order, a Nassau County Supreme Court trial court dismissed all of a
student-plaintiff’s causes of action against a public school district
except for a claim under DASA.24
B.

Decisions in Other Courts

While the Second Department had not yet addressed this issue,
the Third Department had in 2016. In Motta ex rel. Motta v. Eldred
Central School District,25 the Third Department became the first of the
Appellate Division Departments to decide the issue and held:
20

Id.; see also N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 10-18 (McKinney 2018).
Eskenazi-McGibney, No. 15-11449, slip op. at 3.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 4.
24 Simon v. Bellmore-Merrick Cent. High Sch. Dist., No. 0139012013, 2014 WL 11189280
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 14, 2014).
25 36 N.Y.S.3d 239 (App. Div., 3d Dep’t 2016).
21
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There is no explicit private right of action in the
statutory scheme nor can one be implied from the
statutory language and the legislative history (see
Education Law § 10 et seq.). DASA is intended to
create and implement school board policies in order to
“afford all students in public schools an environment
free of discrimination and harassment” caused by
incidents of “bullying, taunting or intimidation”
(Education Law § 10) “through the appropriate training
of personnel, mandatory instruction for students on
civility and tolerance, and reporting requirements” (see
Education Law § 13). To imply a private right of action
would not further the legislative purpose or comport
with the statutory scheme.26
Both before, and after Motta, two federal district courts, relying
on principles of statutory interpretation to DASA’s text and legislative
history, also held the statute does not afford an implied private cause
of action.27 Besides these cases, there were not any reported decisions
on whether DASA provided an implied cause of action.
C.

The Appeal

Defendants appealed the trial court’s decision in Eskenazi.
There was no dispute DASA contains no private cause of action under
which J.E.M. or any other litigant may sue. Defendants disputed the
finding of an implied claim in the statute, arguing the legislative
history explicitly indicates the statute is not meant to serve as means
for a private right of action.
“A statutory command . . . does not necessarily carry with it a
right of private enforcement by means of tort litigation.”28 “When a
statute is silent . . . courts have had to determine whether a private right
of action may be fairly implied.”29
26

Id. at 239 (emphasis added) (internal case citations omitted).
See C.T. v. Valley Stream Union Free Sch. Dist., 201 F. Supp. 3d 307, 327 (E.D.N.Y.
2016) (referencing Motta and holding “there is no private right of action under DASA”);
Terrill v. Windham-Ashland-Jewett Cent. Sch. Dist., 176 F. Supp. 3d 101, 109 (N.D.N.Y.
2016) (noting the court found no “reported decisions permitting a private right of action . . .
under DASA,” reviewed the legislative history, and held DASA does not permit an implied
right of action).
28 Uhr v. E. Greenbush Cent. Sch. Dist., 720 N.E.2d 886, 888 (N.Y. 1999).
29 Id.
27
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The Court of Appeals has developed a three-factor test to
determine whether such an implied right of action exists, which
considers:
(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose
particular benefit the statute was enacted;
(2) whether recognition of a private right of action
would promote the legislative purpose; and
(3) whether creation of such a right would be consistent
with the legislative scheme.30
Applying these factors, the Court of Appeals has “established
that the most critical inquiry in determining whether to recognize a
private cause of action where one is not expressly provided is whether
such action would be consistent with the over-all legislative scheme.”31
Here, DASA is intended to “afford all students in public
schools an environment free of discrimination and harassment.”32 As
a public school student alleging in-school harassment, J.E.M. likely
falls within “the class for whose particular benefit the statute was
enacted.”33 But the important factors regarding legislative purpose and
scheme precluded an implied cause of action.
1.

A Private Cause of Action Would Contradict
DASA’s Legislative Purpose and Scheme

The plain text and legislative history of DASA demonstrate
that an implied private right of action contradicts the statute’s
legislative purpose and scheme.
DASA’s plain text is focused on prevention and enforcement.
“A private right of action for a new type of claim should not be
judicially recognized by implication ‘where the statutes in question
already contain[] substantial enforcement mechanisms, indicating that

30

Id. (citing Sheehy v. Big Flats Cmty. Day, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 1989)); see also In
re Stray from Heart, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene of City of N.Y., 982 N.E.2d
594, 595 (N.Y. 2012).
31 Brian Hoxie’s Painting Co. v. Cato-Meridian Cent. Sch. Dist., 556 N.E.2d 1087, 1089
(N.Y. 1990) (collecting cases).
32 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 10 (McKinney 2018).
33 Eskenazi-McGibney v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist., 89 N.Y.S.3d 295, 297 (App. Div.,
2d Dep’t 2018).
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the Legislature considered how best to effectuate its intent and
provided the avenues for relief it deemed warranted.’”34
DASA’s language contains no indication the Legislature
intended the statute to serve any private remedial function. Rather,
DASA requires schools to impose policies and guidelines to prevent
bullying,35 mandates State Education Department reporting and other
responsibilities regarding the law’s implementation,36 and establishes
protections for individuals reporting harassment.37 This focus on
preventive functions and State regulation shows a private right of
action contradicts DASA’s preventive legislative scheme.38
Also, Education Law § 17 specifically provides that nothing in
DASA will “[p]reclude or limit any right or cause of action under any
local, state or federal ordinance, law or regulation including but not
limited to any rights or remedies available under” the IDEA, Title VII,
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.39 Had the
legislature intended any private right of action, it could have
specifically included such a right in Education Law § 17, or elsewhere,
in the legislation. This also indicates no implied action is available.40
And if DASA’s text was not telling enough, the statute’s
legislative history explicitly indicates, often, that the Legislature did
not intend for the statute to be used as a private right of action. One
federal court, describing the contents of DASA’s legislative “bill
jacket,” noted:

34 Flagstar Bank, FSB v. State, 978 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273 (App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2013)
(alteration in original) (citing Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A., 2 N.E.3d 221, 227 (N.Y. 2013)).
35 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 13.
36 Id. §§ 13-24.
37 Id. § 16.
38 See Mark G. v. Sabol, 717 N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (N.Y. 1999) (explaining that the preventive
services provisions of Child Welfare Reform Act, which provided for comprehensive
enforcement mechanisms centered on local social services districts, did not create implied
private right of action).
39 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 17.
40 See Flagstar Bank, FSB v. State, 978 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273 (App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2013)
(“[T]he Legislature clearly knew how to include a private right of action when it intended to
do so, and the omission of any similar language . . . evinces a legislative intent not to provide
for a private right of action.”); Davis v. State, 937 N.Y.S.2d 521, 523 (App. Div., 4th Dep’t
2012) (citing Mark G., 717 N.E.2d at 1071) (“It is beyond cavil that the Legislature knew how
to include a private right of action in the former statute if it intended to do so and,
‘[c]onsidering that the statute gives no hint of any private enforcement remedy for money
damages,’ we will not infer that the Legislature in fact intended to do so.” (alteration in
original)).
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[I]n a letter from Assemblyman Daniel O’Donnell, who
sponsored DASA in the New York State Assembly, to
Governor David Patterson, Mr. O’Donnell stated that
“the Legislature intends [DASA] to be primarily a
preventive, rather than punitive, measure; it should
therefore be implemented accordingly, with the
emphasis on proactive techniques such as training and
early intervention to prevent discrimination and
harassment.” N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2010 A.B. 3661, Ch. 482
(Letter dated Sept. 7, 2010, from N.Y.S. Assemblyman
Daniel O’Donnell, 69th Assembly District, to N.Y.
Gov. Patterson [sic]) (emphasis added). Similarly,
Senator Thomas Duane wrote to Governor Patterson
[sic] that “DASA focuses on education and prevention
of harassment and discrimination before it begins rather
than punishment after the fact.” N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2010
A.B. 3661, Ch. 482 (Letter dated July 16, 2010, from
N.Y. Senator Thomas Duane, 29th District, to N.Y.
Gov. Patterson [sic]) (emphasis in original).41
And during the Assembly floor debate of DASA, one legislator
asked “[w]hat is the remedy, if you will, for a student who feels that
they were harassed and the school has this policy in place, but doesn’t
abide by the policy?”42 The Assembly sponsor of the bill responded:
This bill does not address any remedy beyond internally
to the school. The school has an obligation to have a
policy. The school has an obligation to have people on
staff who know how to deal with the policy. The school
has an obligation to protect all children from that
conduct. If, in fact, the school fails, then the school
fails. This bill has nothing to do with the remedy outside
the school failing. This bill requires the State Education
Department to promulgate regulations to assist schools,
if they need assisting, on how to make sure that schools

41 Terrill v. Windham-Ashland-Jewett Cent. Sch. Dist., 176 F. Supp. 3d 101, 107-08
(N.D.N.Y. 2016) (alteration in original).
42 Id. at 108.
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remain an environment that are free from harassment
and discrimination.43
The Legislature also drafted the bill “to be integrated with
existing SED programs—such as the Safe Schools Against Violence
Education Program (Project SAVE).”44 DASA extended some of the
same training and reporting obligations previously imposed by Project
SAVE.45 Education Law § 15 specifically provides that the
Commissioner could establish a procedure for school district
submission of annual reports of material incidents of harassment,
bullying and discrimination through the “use of the existing uniform
violent incident reporting system.”46 But the Project SAVE legislation
also does not provide a private right of action.
D.

The Appellate Decision

On December 12, 2018, the Second Department found in
Defendants’ favor and ruled there is no implied private right of action
under DASA for an alleged failure to enforce policies prohibiting
discrimination and harassment.47
In line with Court of Appeals jurisprudence, the Second
Department focused on whether recognition of an implied right of
action would be consistent with DASA’s legislative scheme. In the
court’s words, this inquiry
is the most critical because “the Legislature has both the
right and the authority to select the methods to be used
in effectuating its goals, as well as to choose the goals
themselves. Thus, regardless of its consistency with the
basic legislative goal, a private right of action should
not be judicially sanctioned if it is incompatible with
the enforcement mechanism chosen by the Legislature
or with some other aspect of the over-all statutory
scheme.”48
43 Id. at 108-09; Assemb. 3661, 223d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 17-18 (N.Y. 2010) (emphasis
added).
44
Assemb. 3661, at 9.
45 See id. at 3.
46 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 15 (McKinney 2018).
47 See Eskenazi-McGibney v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist., 89 N.Y.S.3d 295, 299 (App.
Div., 2d Dep’t 2018).
48 Id. at 297 (quoting Sheehy v. Big Flats Cmty. Day, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 18, 21 (N.Y. 1989)).
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Turning to DASA, the court concluded that “[a] review of
DASA’s legislative history shows that finding a private right of action
under the act would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme.”49 For
example, the court cited Senator Duane’s letter to the Governor in
which he described DASA as focusing “on the education and
prevention of harassment and discrimination before it begins rather
than punishment after the fact.”50 The court also honed in on Senator
Duane’s observation that under the existing regime, school districts
were paying “a high cost in civil damages for failure to prevent
bullying,” thereby suggesting that implementing DASA would
alleviate such costs.51 Similarly, the court relied on the bill sponsor’s
statement “the Legislature intends [DASA] to be primarily a
preventive, rather than punitive, measure; it should therefore be
implemented accordingly, with the emphasis on proactive techniques
such as training and early intervention to prevent discrimination and
harassment.”52 The court concluded, “[t]he legislative history plainly
demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to provide for civil
damages for a violation of DASA, and that recognizing one would be
inconsistent with the legislative scheme.”53
IV.

CONCLUSION

So, should bullies be rejoicing about this legal development?
Of course not. Indeed, the Second Department made clear, “DASA
does not prevent a student from bringing other statutory claims against
a school district, and thus, holding that DASA does not provide a
private right of action does not leave students without enforcement
mechanisms and remedies.”54 Families can still commence claims of
negligent supervision and possibly violations of federal statutes
depending on the particulars.

49
50

Id.
Id. at 298 (quoting Senate Introducer’s Letter in Support, Bill Jacket, L. 2010 ch. 482 at

7).
51

Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Assembly Sponsor’s Letter in Support, Bill Jacket, L.
2010 ch. 482 at 11).
53 Id.
54 Id. (citing Terrill v. Windham-Ashland-Jewett Cent. Sch. Dist., 176 F. Supp. 3d 101, 109
(N.D.N.Y. 2016)).
52
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Further, as addressed in the Second Department decision of SC
v. Monroe-Woodbury Central School District,55 a parent may file a
complaint with the New York State Commissioner of Education when
seeking to challenge a school district’s policies.56 “Allegations that a
public school failed to adopt and implement adequate policies and
procedures to prevent bullying and harassment should be addressed, in
the first instance, to the Commissioner of Education.”57
This is because Education Law § 310 provides that an
aggrieved party may appeal to the commissioner of education “any . .
. official act or decision of any officer, school authorities, or meetings
concerning any other matter under [the New York Education Law], or
any other act pertaining to common schools.”58 This provision
provides the commissioner with “broad discretion” to review a “wide
range of actions.”59
In conclusion, DASA has been an effective tool in reducing
incidents of student harassment. It just will not be an effective tool in
generating litigation.60

55 23 N.Y.S.3d 906 (App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2016), leave to appeal denied sub nom. SC v.
Monroe Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 56 N.E.3d 898 (N.Y. 2016).
56 Id. at 906.
57 Id. (citing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 310; cf. Matter of N. Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v. N.Y.
State Div. of Human Rights, 973 N.E.2d 162 (N.Y. 2012).
58 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 310(7) (McKinney 2018).
59 Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 248 (2d Cir.
2006); see also Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979) (in
dismissing a claim of “educational malpractice,” citing, under New York Education Law §
310(7), “the right of students presently enrolled in public schools, and their parents, to take
advantage of the administrative processes provided by statute to enlist the aid of the
Commissioner of Education in ensuring that such students receive a proper education”).
60 The authors represented ESB in the referenced litigation.
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